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Remembering everyday events typically takes less time than the actual duration of the retrieved 
episodes, a phenomenon that has been referred to as the temporal compression of events in 
episodic memory. Here, we review recent studies that have shed light on how this compression 
mechanism operates. The evidence suggests that the continuous flow of experience is not 
represented as such in episodic memory. Instead, the unfolding of events is recalled as a succession 
of moments or slices of past experience that includes temporal discontinuities—portions of past 
experience are omitted when remembering. Consequently, the rate of event compression is not 
constant but depends on the density of recalled segments of past experience. 
 





Human memory has finite limits on processing and storage capacities (Bates & Jacobs, 2020). At any 
given moment, only a fraction of the information content of our external and internal environments 
is perceived and encoded. Further, the continuous succession of moments that constitute our 
experience is not represented as such in memory. Indeed, episodic memories are not complete 
records of the flow of experience but instead represent events in a temporally compressed form 
(Jeunehomme et al., 2018). As an illustration, take a moment to remember your commute to work 
this morning. As hard as you try, you will not remember every single moment of your journey. 
Instead, your memory will likely consist of a series of slices of your past experience that includes 
discontinuities, as if you mentally “jumped” from one moment of experience to another without 
representing everything that happened in between. For example, you might remember a particular 
crossroad and then jump to the next crossroad without representing the entire route that linked 
these two points. Metaphorically speaking, memory for the unfolding of events is more like a time-
lapse or an edited movie rather than a continuous video recording. In this article, we review recent 
research that has advanced our understanding of how the unfolding of real-life events is compressed 
in episodic memory representations. Note that due to space limitation, we focus on studies that 
investigated the temporal compression of events in memory but do not address research on memory 
for temporal information per se, such as judgments of duration or recency (see e.g., Block & Reed, 
1978; Brunec et al., 2017; DuBrow & Davachi, 2013; Fenerci et al., 2020; Yarmey, 2000).  
 
The time to remember 
Episodic remembering is a sort of “mental time travel” in which the rememberer reconstructs a 
specific event from the past (Tulving, 2002). For complex real-life events that dynamically unfold over 
time, this reconstruction process typically involves a succession of event details that are organized in 
chronological order (R. J. Anderson et al., 2015; S. J. Anderson & Conway, 1993). However, memories 
are not exact replicas but instead summary records of past experience (Conway, 2009). The unfolding 
of events is somehow compacted in mnemonic representations, such that the time needed to 
remember an event is shorter than the actual duration of this event in the past—a phenomenon that 
is here referred to as the temporal compression of events (Jeunehomme & D’Argembeau, 2019). 
Indeed, episodic memory would not be functional if remembering an event necessarily took as much 
time as the duration of the past episode; if this were the case, we would be wasting a considerable 
amount of time and resources mentally revisiting the past and would rarely be fully focused on the 
present moment.  
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The temporal compression of events in memory representations has been evidenced in recent 
studies that compared the time needed to remember an event to the actual event duration. In one of 
the first studies that quantified compression rates, Bonasia et al. (2016) asked participants to 
mentally navigate familiar routes between campus landmarks. The compression of route 
representations was calculated by dividing the time it would take to walk each route over the time 
taken to navigate this route mentally. The results showed that all participants demonstrated 
consistently compressed representations, with compression factors varying from about 5 to 35 
depending on route length and number of turns. However, it is unclear from this study whether 
these compression rates apply to memory for unique events (i.e., episodic memories) because the 
mental navigation task that was used could rely on schematic representations (i.e., a mental map of 
campus acquired over multiple experiences).  
To investigate temporal compression rates for unique events, Jeunehomme and D’Argembeau (2019) 
asked participants to go on a tour on a campus while their experience was recorded using wearable 
camera technology: a small wearable camera automatically took a continuous sequence of pictures 
of experienced events from the first-person perspective. The pictures taken during the tour were 
then used to cue memory for specific events that were clearly delimited in time and which actual 
duration was known (based on the pictures taken by the camera). For each event, participants were 
asked to mentally re-experience everything that happened in as much detail as possible, and the 
duration of their mental replay was measured. It was found that participants consistently spent less 
time remembering events compared to the actual event duration: on average, events were replayed 
about eight times faster than the actual event duration, with substantial variation in compression 
rates across events (see also Chen et al., 2017; Folville et al., 2020; Jeunehomme et al., 2020).  
 
Episodic remembering involves lossy compression 
The above-mentioned studies show that remembering an event takes less time than the actual event 
duration, but how exactly is the dynamic unfolding of past experience represented during episodic 
remembering? To investigate this question, Jeunehomme et al. (2018) asked participants to verbally 
describe everything that came to their minds when they remembered events experienced during a 
tour on campus. The analysis of verbal reports showed that memories consisted of a succession of 
moments or slices of past experience—referred to as experience units—that represented the 
unfolding of events in chronological order; note that each unit was itself composed of a set of details 
that characterized a given moment of past experience, such as people, objects, actions, mental 
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states, and so on.1 Importantly, however, the succession of experience units was not a replica of the 
continuous flow of past experience but included discontinuities in the representation of the 
unfolding of events. For example, when remembering buying a newspaper, a participant experienced 
a mental image of arriving in front of the shop’s door, then an image of picking the daily newspaper 
on the shelf inside the shop, and finally an image of paying the seller on the other side of the shop; 
these three moments of past experience were separated by several seconds in the actual event, but 
these intervening instants (e.g., going from the newspaper shelf to the cashier’s desk) were not 
recalled. To provide an estimation of the time separating experience units in terms of the actual 
event duration, participants were asked to review the sequence of pictures that had been taken by a 
wearable camera during their tour and they had to select the pictures that best corresponded to 
each experience unit they recalled. The actual duration separating the selected pictures was 
computed, which showed that the successive experience units that composed memories represented 
moments of past experience that were on average about 50 seconds apart in the actual event (with 
substantial variability across events).  
Recent neurophysiological evidence provides further support to the idea that episodic remembering 
involves temporal discontinuities (Michelmann et al., 2019). At encoding, participants saw short 
video clips that were composed of three successive scenes and a word cue was presented during one 
of the scenes; at retrieval, they saw the word cue and had to determine in which scene it had been 
presented. MEG data showed that each scene that was presented at encoding was associated with a 
content-specific fingerprint in the oscillatory phase and these scene-specific phase patterns were 
then used to track the dynamics of memory retrieval. The results indicated that the mental replay of 
the video clips was overall faster than perception, showing a global temporal compression effect. 
Interestingly, however, the speed of replay within scenes was slower than the overall compression 
level of the entire video, with some fragments being replayed at the same speed as perception. This 
disparity between the slower speed of replay within scenes and the overall compression suggests 
that participants replayed fine-grained segments of the video while omitting other segments. 
Collectively, these studies suggest that the unfolding of events is compressed during episodic 
remembering because parts of the continuous flow of information that characterized past experience 
are not represented—a form of compression that engineers would refer to as “lossy compression” 
(Figure 1). Such temporal gaps in mnemonic representations (i.e., leaving out certain parts of the 
 
1 Although the exact nature of experience units remains to be investigated in detail, it is likely that most of 
them are not static snapshots of prior experience but instead consist in dynamic representations of more or 
less extended portions of prior experience. 
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events) may provide an efficient way of summarizing the unfolding of events, similarly to the way 
events are condensed in movies (Schwan & Garsoffky, 2004).  
 
Compression rates are variable and depend on event segmentation 
It is important to note that the rate of event compression in episodic memory representations is not 
constant but varies substantially across events. For example, a consistent finding has been that 
events in which participants perform specific actions (e.g., buying a newspaper) are less compressed 
than events that only involve spatial navigation (e.g., going from one place to another with no action 
to perform except walking) (Folville et al., 2020; Jeunehomme et al., 2018, 2020; Jeunehomme & 
D’Argembeau, 2019). In fact, the rate of temporal compression of an event in memory (i.e., the time 
needed to remember an event relative to the actual event duration) is inversely related to the 
density of experience units that are recalled (i.e., the number of experience units recalled per unit of 
time of the actual event duration) (Jeunehomme & D’Argembeau, 2019).2 A critical question then is 
what determines the density of experience units in episodic memories?  
Behavioural and neural evidence suggest that the formation of episodic memory units depends on 
the segmentation of the continuous stream of experience into events and sub-events (for review, see 
Radvansky & Zacks, 2017; Zacks, 2020). At any given moment, we make sense of our experience by 
constructing a mental model of the current situation. Such event models are constantly updated 
according to dynamic changes in various dimensions of ongoing experience (e.g., changes in location, 
characters, objects, goals, and so forth), which result in the perception of event boundaries—the 
perception that an event has ended and another event has begun (Zacks et al., 2007). Event 
boundaries are created at multiple timescales and the resulting event segments are organized 
hierarchically, with groups of fine-grained sub-events (e.g., fill the sink with soaped water, scrub the 
dishes, rinse the dishes, dry the dishes, and so on) clustering in larger units (e.g., washing the dishes, 
making coffee, and so on) (Baldassano et al., 2017; Sargent et al., 2013). Episodic memories reflect 
this structure of event processing, with the event segments formed during perception corresponding 
to the representational units in memory (Baldassano et al., 2017; Radvansky & Zacks, 2017; Zacks, 
2020). Thus, event boundaries are better recalled than event middles (Gold et al., 2017; Schwan & 
Garsoffky, 2004). Furthermore, the grain size of event segmentation during encoding impacts how 
 
2 Note that a similar relation has been observed for the remembered duration of an event, with evidence 
showing that duration estimates increase with the amount of information retrieved from memory—more 
specifically the amount of perceptual or contextual changes in the remembered event (see e.g., Block & Reed, 
1978; Fenerci et al., 2020; Jeunehomme & D'Argembeau, 2019; Roseboom et al., 2019). 
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well events are subsequently remembered: recall is more detailed after fine-grained segmentation 
than after coarse-grained segmentation (Hanson & Hirst, 1989; Lassiter et al., 1988).  
The rate of event compression in episodic memories might thus depend on the granularity of event 
segmentation. To test this hypothesis, Jeunehomme and D’Argembeau (2020) asked participants to 
remember a series of events previously experienced during a tour on campus and the density of 
recalled experience units was quantified based on their verbal reports. Then, participants were 
presented with a continuous sequence of pictures representing their past experience (which had 
been taken by a wearable camera) and were asked to segment this sequence into the smallest units 
that made sense to them. To do so, they pressed a button each time they identified a transition 
between two events or sub-events (i.e., when one event or sub-event ended and another one 
began). It was found that the density of experience units reported in the memory task (i.e., the 
number recalled experience units per minute of the actual event duration) was predicted by the 
segmentation density of the picture sequence (i.e., the number of event boundaries identified per 
unit of time). Furthermore, event boundaries were more than five times more likely to be recalled 
than other parts of events. In fact, many moments of experience between event boundaries were 
not recalled, leaving temporal gaps in the representation of events. Taken together, these results 
suggest that events that are perceived in terms of finer sub-events are sampled at a higher rate, 
leading to a higher density of experience units in episodic memory representations (see also Faber & 
Gennari, 2015).  
 
Principles that structure the organization of experience units  
We have seen that memories for dynamic real-life events are composed of a succession of 
experience units that represent the unfolding of events in a compressed form. This structure of 
mnemonic representations raises the question of how sequences of experience units that include 
temporal discontinuities are organized and linked together to form coherent event representations. 
Here, we briefly consider three possible (non-mutually exclusive) mechanisms.  
First, it is likely that prior knowledge plays a key role in the encoding and retrieval of event structure. 
In particular, event schemas may provide information about temporal order and causal relations 
between the event segments that compose memories (Radvansky & Zacks, 2011). Second, the 
hierarchy of goal processing (goals and sub-goals) may also structure event sequences, notably in 
terms of actions and their outcomes (Lichtenstein & Brewer, 1980; Williams et al., 2008). Third, 
contextual states associated with ongoing experience may form a background that contributes to 
information integration and segmentation in memory representations. Indeed, research has shown 
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that periods of stability or gradual change in contextual features (e.g., one’s surroundings and 
internal states) makes temporally proximal experiences to cohere with one another in memory 
(Howard, 2017; Polyn & Cutler, 2017), whereas contextual changes create separations in memory 
(i.e., event boundaries) that lead to distinct representational units (Clewett & Davachi, 2017; DuBrow 
et al., 2017; Radvansky & Zacks, 2017). While this organizational role of contextual states has been 
mainly evidenced using laboratory stimuli (i.e., word lists), recent studies have shown that the recall 
dynamics of real-world events follow similar principles (e.g., a temporal contiguity effect) (Diamond 
& Levine, 2020; Stawarczyk & D’Argembeau, 2019). Thus, contextual stability may contribute to the 
integration of information into meaningful experience units, whereas contextual shifts may be used 
as transition points to skip segments of past experience when remembering the unfolding of events: 
to speed up remembering, people may transition from one contextual shift to another without 
necessarily representing everything that happened in between.  
A question that remains to be investigated in detail is to what extent the temporal compression of 
events reflects how they are encoded and stored in episodic memory versus how they are 
reconstructed at retrieval. In previous studies that assessed event compression rates, participants 
were instructed to recall everything they could in order to mentally re-experience events in as much 
detail as possible (Folville et al., 2020; Jeunehomme et al., 2018; Jeunehomme & D’Argembeau, 
2019, 2020). Thus, the observation of temporal discontinuities in the unfolding of recalled events 
probably reflects, at least in part, properties of stored representations (although of course 
differences in the accessibility of representations may also play some role). In support of this view, it 
has been shown that during event perception people preferentially sample highly informative 
regions of the sensory stream over less informative regions, such that certain parts of events (i.e., 
event boundaries) are more efficiently encoded in memory (Hard et al., 2011; Kosie & Baldwin, 
2019). However, this does not preclude the possibility of flexibly adjusting the speed of memory 
replay at retrieval, according to retrieval goals (Bellmund et al., 2020). Future studies could 
investigate this flexibility, for example, by manipulating retrieval instructions. In fact, for any given 
act of remembering, it is likely that the structure of stored representations and retrieval conditions 
conjointly determine the rate of event compression. Beyond episodic remembering, a similar 
compression mechanism may also operate when mentally simulating future events (Arnold et al., 
2016; Jeunehomme et al., 2020). 
 
Conclusion 
The continuous stream of experience that forms the fabric of daily life is not represented as such in 
episodic memory. When remembering an event, the unfolding of past experience is summarized as a 
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succession of moments or slices of experience that includes temporal discontinuities. This 
compression mechanism allows us to revisit the past in a speeded manner, with the rate of event 
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Figure 1. Schematic illustration of the temporal compression of events in episodic memory 
representations. The continuous flow of past experience (upper panel) is compressed in episodic 
memory as a succession of moments or slices of experience (lower panel) that includes temporal 
gaps in the representation of the event’s unfolding (i.e., some segments of past experience are not 
represented).  
 
 
